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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENT
Adam M. Dodek*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2007, then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of
emergency, suspended the Constitution and summarily dismissed the Chief Justice and other
members of the High Court.1 Images of middle-class lawyers in court attire clashing with police
were broadcast around the world. In the campaign for parliamentary elections held in February
2008, the two leading opposition parties pledged to restore the independence of the judiciary.
For the opposition, hitching their political wagon to the independence of judiciary was a highly
successful political strategy which contributed to their overwhelming victory. However, after
they formed the government, the two parties quickly began to bicker over the details of restoring
the deposed judges, leading to a political stalemate.
The Pakistani experience is instructive because of the transparency with which judicial
independence was used for political purposes. In less overt instances, governments in common
law countries have long turned to judges to address some of the most vexing and controversial
public policy issues of the day. Commissions of inquiry are the most obvious example. In the
United States, Chief Justice Earl Warren headed the Commission which bore his name
investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In South Africa, President F.W. de
Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela tapped Justice Richard Goldstone2 to head an inquiry
into allegations of state-sponsored violence that threatened to destabilize that country’s
democratic transition. In Israel, judges have headed commissions inquiring into intelligence
failures of the Yom Kippur War, the massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in
Lebanon in 1982 and most recently into Israel’s prosecution of the war against Hezbollah in
Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Public inquiries have a strong pedigree in the United Kingdom
as well.
*
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See the chapters by Justice Robert Sharpe and Janice Gross Stein in this volume.
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Justice Goldstone has authored the Foreword to this volume.
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Canada inherited this penchant for public inquiries3 and their popularity stretches back
beyond Canada’s founding in 1867.4 In recent years, however, public inquiries have become
much more prevalent at both the federal and provincial levels with names like Arar, Gomery,
Ipperwash, Air India, Tasers and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) entering the
Canadian political lexicon. Moreover, what is particularly striking in Canada is the vast
expansion of the use of judges by governments for many “independent reviews” and other
functions that may mix adjudicative, legislative and executive functions. Examples include the
use of judges to head commissions that set electoral boundaries, targeted policy reviews and the
appointment of sitting or retired judges as members or chairs of tribunals and officers of the
legislature.
Much has been written about commissions of inquiry and their benefits and pitfalls in the
public policy process.5 There is no question that the participation of judges in commissions of
inquiry has been an important part of the public policy process in Canada.6 However, the use of
judges for these and other extra-judicial functions is not wholly positive and the other side of the
balance must be considered as well. This paper thus approaches this issue in a decidedly
different manner that is at once more expansive and more narrowly focused. This chapter
chronicles the dramatic rise of the use of judges by governments for such policy functions,
arguing that it has resulted in a “judicialization of politics” of a different sort from the standard
3

Public inquiries are variously referred to as commissions of inquiry or sometimes by the older term “royal
commissions”. In this paper, I use the terms public inquiries and commissions of inquiry interchangeably.

4

See Thomas J. Lockwood, “A History of Royal Commissions” (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 172; Watson Sellar, “A
Century of Commissions of Inquiry” (1947) 24 Can. Bar Rev. 1; Canada, Library and Archives Canada, “Index to
Federal Royal Commissions”, online: http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/7/6/index-e.html (noting that there have
been over 200 federal commissions of inquiry since Confederation in 1867).
5

See e.g. Dennis R. O’Connor & Freya Kristjanson, “Some Observations on Public Inquiries” (Paper presented at
the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice’s Annual Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 10 October
2007), online: http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/publicinquiries.htm (Alternate title: “Why Public
Inquiries Work”); Justice John H. Gomery, “The Pros and Cons of Commissions of Inquiry” (2006) 51 McGill L.J.
783; Allan Manson & David Mullan, eds., Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise? (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2003); Nicholas d’Ombrain, “Public Inquiries in Canada” (1997) 40:1 Canadian Public Administration 86; A. Paul
Pross, Innis Christie & John A. Yogis, eds., Commissions of Inquiry (Toronto: Carswell, 1990); Gordon F.
Henderson, “Abuse of Power by Royal Commissions” in Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures (Toronto:
Law Society of Upper Canada, 1979); Canada, Law Reform Commission, Report 13: Advisory and Investigatory
Commissions (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1979); John C. Courtney, “In Defence of Royal Commissions”
(Summer 1969) 12:2 Canadian Public Administration 204; J.E. Hodgetts, “Should Canada be De-Commissioned? A
Commoner’s View of Royal Commissions” (Winter 1964) 70:4 Queen’s Quarterly 483.
6

Starr v. Houlden, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1366 at 1410-11 (noting functions of public inquiries include enabling
government to secure information as a basis for developing or implementing policy, educating the public or
legislative branch, investigating the administration of government and permitting the public voicing of grievances);
and ibid. at 1413 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting, but not on this point (“neither my colleague nor any of the
parties dispute the fact that commissions of inquiry have played a useful and necessary role in Canada”).
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conception of that term. The current political culture of independence and accountability has
made judicial independence a highly valued political commodity that is frequently in demand by
government officials. This chapter will argue that what public policy makers are seeking is not
simply the expertise of judges but also the political capital of judicial independence which has
become an increasingly valued political good in Canadian society (and likely in others as well).
In Canada we increasingly value independence from political decision making.7 This
paper analyzes and evaluates this trend from the perspective of judicial independence. While I
acknowledge that the use of judges for public policy purposes certainly has distinct benefits that
have been well chronicled by others, my thesis is that this phenomenon also has the potential to
undermine the bedrock principle of judicial independence if it is not better managed by the
judiciary in concert with the executive. I begin therefore by examining the nature and purpose of
judicial independence. I then describe the judicialization of politics noted above before
analyzing two cautionary tales from the use of judicial independence for public policy purposes:
the Gomery Inquiry and the controversy over the Chief Justice’s involvement in the award of the
Order of Canada to abortion activist Dr. Henry Morgentaler. Finally, this paper ends with the
argument that taking judicial independence seriously necessitates that judges develop a
framework for the consideration of extra-judicial functions and begin to exercise greater
discretion in refusing to take on executive functions at times, lest the political currency of
judicial independence become devalued over time.

II. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
A. THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a highly valued constitutional norm around the world.8 In
Canada, it has been elevated to the status of an unwritten constitutional principle9 that has equal
7

While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is my assertion that governments’ penchant of relying on outside
“independent” experts such as judges has degraded both the capabilities and the legitimacy of the legislative and
executive branches of government.

8

See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art. 10 (“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14 (“All persons shall be
equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”); Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (adopted by the First
World Conference on the Independence of Justice, Montreal, June 1983) in Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschênes,
eds., Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1985) 447; United Nations. Implementation Of The Basic Principles On The Independence Of The Judiciary
(adopted at the Eighth Congress On The Prevention Of Crime And Treatment Of Offenders. Havana, Cuba: 27
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if not stronger force than some of the textual provisions of Canada’s Constitution.10 However, as
Peter Russell explains in his contribution to this book, there has been a lack of agreement about
what judicial independence encompasses.11 Russell’s theoretical framework attempts to isolate
and describe the elusive “it” that is judicial independence. In this chapter, I focus largely on
judicial statements in order to set out the nature and purpose of judicial independence against
which I evaluate its use as a policy good outside of the adjudication process in the sections that
follow.
In Canada and around the world it is widely acknowledged that judicial independence is
not an end in itself. Judicial independence, it is claimed, serves various other social and political
objectives.12 As Chief Justice Lamer asserted in the Provincial Judges Reference, “judicial
independence . . . is not an end it itself…[it] is valued because it serves important societal goals
– it is a means to secure those goals.”13 As Peter Russell has argued, “[t]hose who believe that
some measure of judicial independence is desirable must hold this belief, because judicial
independence is thought to serve some important objective, to contribute to some desirable state
August - 7 September, 1990 (A/Conf.144/190) and Corrigendum; United Nations,.Guidelines on the Independence
of the Judiciary (adopted at the Seventh Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Milan,
Italy: 26 August - 6 September 1985) (A/Conf.121/9) and Corrigendum; International Bar Association. Minimum
Standards of Judicial Independence, 2006. On the value placed on judicial independence around the world see the
contributions in this volume by Jameson Doig (United States), Penelope Andrews (South Africa), Graham Gee
(United Kingdom), Justice Robert Sharpe (Pakistan), Amnon Reichman (Israel), Fabien Gélinas (international
system) as well as the Foreword of Justice Richard Goldstone.
9

See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; Reference re
Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v.
Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3
[Provincial Judges Reference].

10

See the chapters of Peter Hogg and Amnon Reichman in this collection.

11

See the contribution of Peter Russell in this collection. See also Linda Greenhouse, “Independence: why & from
what?” (Fall 2008) 137:4 Daedelus 5 at 5 (“’Judicial independence’ is a concept easier to salute reflexively than to
grasp fully.”).

12

See e.g. Judith Resnik, “Interdependent federal judiciaries: puzzling about why & how to value the independence
of which judges” (Fall 2008) 137:4 Daedelus 28 at 47 (“[j]udicial independence is an instrumental value”); Vicki C.
Jackson, “Packages of judicial independence: implications for reform proposals on the selection & tenure of Article
III judges” (Fall 2008) 137:4 Daedelus 48 at 48 (“[j]udicial independence is necessary to assure the rule of law and
protection of rights”); Charles Gardner Geyh, “Methods of judicial selection & their impact on judicial
independence” (Fall 2008) 137:4 Daedelus 86 at 86 (“Within the legal community judicial independence is
understood, not as an intrinsic good or an end it itself, but as a means to achieve other ends.”); Stephen B. Burbank
& Barry Friedman, “Reconsidering Judicial Independence” in Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds., Judicial
Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002) 9 at
10 (“judicial independence is a means to an end (or, more probably, to more than one end ”) (emphasis in original).
See also Peter H. Russell, “Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence” in Peter H. Russell & David M.
O’Brien, eds., Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from around the World
(Charlottesville & London: University of Virginia Press, 2001) 1 at 3.

13

Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 13 at para. 9. See also the Rt. Hon. Beverly McLachlin “Judicial
Accountability” (2008) 1 Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law 293 at 298.
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of affairs.”14 Judicial independence is thus a second order constitutional and political value by
which I mean that its existence and vitality serves other first order values.
This instrumental view of judicial independence predominates in the literature15 and the
jurisprudence although it is often lost in the heated rhetoric that arises when there are purported
threats to judicial independence. Frequently in such cases, defenders against such perceived
incursions fail to articulate the nature of the threat to judicial independence let alone how the
threat undermines the relevant first order values that judicial independence is intended to
protect.16 Judicial independence is regularly invoked as a shield against changes to judicial
structure or benefits. However, such invocations of the shibboleth of judicial independence
often overlook or ignore the idea that judicial independence is not an end it itself and certainly its
purpose is not to protect judicial privileges.17 To better understand the nature and purpose of
judicial independence it is necessary to hone in on the arguments for it.

14

Peter H. Russell, “Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence” in Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien,
eds., Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from around the World (Charlottesville
& London: University of Virginia Press, 2001) 1 at 3.

15

See e.g. Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, “Reconsidering Judicial Independence” in Stephen B. Burbank &
Barry Friedman, eds., Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 2002) 9 at 10-11; John Ferejohn, “Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary, “Explaining
Judicial Independence) (1999) 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353. Russell, “Towards a General Theory of Judicial
Independence”, ibid. at 2. In this volume see e.g. the contributions of Sonia Lawrence (“judicial independence is not
a ‘goal in itself,’ but rather a means to impartiality and legitimacy, so that links between diversity and legitimacy
and impartiality might not explicitly mention judicial independence despite a clear connection.”) (manuscript at 2);
Rosemary Cairns Way (“The [Social Context Education Project] aimed to engaged that conceptualization directly by
challenging participants to understand independence purposively as an essential means of protecting and fostering
the core obligation of impartiality”) (manuscript at 24), Patricia Hughes (“It is trite to say, but always worth
remembering, that judicial independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is crucial to the rule of law and the ability
of judges to be impartial.”) (manuscript at 7).

16

For example, in 2007 the Canadian Judicial Council and the bar vigorously opposed plans by the federal Minister
of Justice to change the composition of the judicial advisory committees that vet candidates for federal judicial
appointments but failed to convincingly articulate how such changes could threaten any of the values that the
independence of the judiciary is intended to protect. See Tonda MacCharles, “Tories imperil neutral courts: Judges;
Plans for advisory committees risk politicizing system, council argues” The Toronto Star (21 February 2007); Helen
Burnett, “Independent judiciary put in peril” The Law Times (26 February 2007) (citing a Canadian Judicial Council
letter openly criticizing proposed changes to the committees that advise on federal judicial appointments); Canadian
Judicial Council, Press Release: Judicial Appointments: Perspective from the Canadian Judicial Council” (2
February 2007), online: http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/news_en.asp?selMenu=news_2007_0220_en.asp. The
arguments that such changes “imperiled” the independence of the judiciary were flimsy and empirical evidence to
support such claims is rather weak.

17

See Provincial Court Judges Reference, supra note 17 at para. 9 and Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of
Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, 2002 SCC 13 at para. 28 [Mackin].
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B. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY INTERTWINED
Most arguments for judicial independence are based on the critical connection between it
and judicial impartiality. The customary case for judicial independence is composed of several
interconnected strands. First, judicial independence is required to ensure judicial impartiality.
Second, this impartiality in turn promotes public confidence in the impartial adjudication of
disputes which secures the legitimacy of the legal system. Finally, such confidence and
legitimacy upholds the Rule of Law, although at times it is asserted that judicial independence
itself directly serves these functions.18 Let me attempt to unpack this by explaining the nexus
and the distinction between judicial independence and judicial impartiality. The two concepts
are closely linked and are often asserted in tandem: “[i]ndependent and impartial adjudication is
essential to a free and democratic society.”19 However, the twin ideas of independence and
impartiality are distinct.
In Valente (1985), Justice Le Dain distinguished between the two concepts. He explained
that “impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relations to the issues and
the parties in a particular case.”20 Independence, on the other hand, refers to the “status or
relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of government, that rests on objective
conditions or guarantees.”21 It is asserted that independence is necessary in order to promote and
protect impartiality. As Chief Justice Lamer explained in Lippé (1991), “[j]udicial independence
is critical to the public’s perception of impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary
prerequisite, for judicial impartiality.”22 Along similar lines, the Canadian Judicial Council has
explained that “[j]udicial independence is not the private right of judges but the foundation of
judicial impartiality and a constitutional right of all Canadians. Independence of the judiciary
refers to the necessary individual and collective or institutional independence required for
impartial decisions and decision making.”23 Judicial independence is derivative of impartiality
and a protective shield to ensure it.
Within each instrumental thread of judicial independence we can see how the concept is
tied to the adjudication of disputes, the defining characteristic of the judicial function. Simply
18

See e.g. Mackeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796 at para. 58.

19

Martin L. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian
Judicial Council, 1995) 1. See also Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian
Judicial Council, 1998) 7 (“An independent judiciary is indispensable to impartial justice under law.”).

20

R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at 685.

21

Ibid. In Mackeigan, supra note 18 at para. 56, McLachlin J. (as she then was) explained that judicial impartiality
involved a state of mind whereas judicial independence concerned the relationship between judges and others,
particularly those in government.

22

R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at para. 48.

23

Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998) 8.
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put, judges interpret and apply the law to specific situations; they adjudicate; they decide
disputes.24 This is an obvious but important point and other functions that judges perform are
subsidiary to this core function. The Supreme Court made this explicit link to adjudication when
it stated that the independence of individual judges is necessary to ensure “the complete liberty
of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them”.25 Judicial
independence is clearly linked to the impartial adjudication of disputes; impartiality is the sine
qua non of adjudication. When judges are engaged in activities outside of adjudication (“extrajudicial activities”), the premise for their independence – impartiality in dispute adjudication -- is
removed.26 While new arguments for the independence of judges engaged in extra-judicial
activities may exist, they need to be constructed and proffered as they cannot be based on the
adjudicatory functions. There are different types of extra-judicial activities and each requires
examination through the lens of judicial independence. In the next section I analyze several
types of extra-judicial activities and explain how judicial independence is used instrumentally
outside of the core adjudicatory function of the judiciary.

III. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS
A PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENT
A. THE RISE OF THE JUDGES
The judiciary in Canada and in most countries is established as a separate branch of
government and this idea of separation of powers is an important feature of judicial
independence. When judges act outside of their constitutionally mandated judicial role,
questions exist regarding the separation of powers and the appropriateness of judges acting in
what, strictly speaking, are non-judicial capacities. While the judiciary has acknowledged the
24

See Fraser v. Public Service Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455 at 469-70 (per Dickson C.J.) (explaining that
in broad terms, “the role of the judiciary is…to interpret and apply the law; the role of the legislature is to decide
upon and enunciate policy; the role if the executive is to administer and implement that policy.”).

25

Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 9 at para. 123 quoting Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 69.
See also Provincial Judges Reference, ibid. at para. 10 (“One of these goals is the maintenance of public confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary which is essential to the effectiveness of the court system. Independence
contributes to the perception that justice will be done in individual cases.”).

26

On the multiplicity of non-adjudicatory functions performed by judges see generally Peter H. Russell, The
Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) 10-13.
I acknowledge the potential caveat that in Canada judges perform a quasi-executive advisory function through the
reference power where with certain narrow exceptions they must accept and opine on various abstract questions put
to them by the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant Governor in Council. See e.g. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.
1985, C. S-25, s. 53 (Reference by Governor in Council), 54 (Reference by Senate or House of Commons); Courts
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, s. 8; and Court of Appeal Reference Act, R.S.Q., c. R-23.
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existence of potential problems,27 serious scrutiny has yet to be undertaken. Extra-judicial
activities are not wholly without their potential costs. At this point, I wish to raise some
theoretical issues with the use of judges for public policy purposes.
Governments have frequently sought the assistance of judges for public policy purposes. The
first conceptual problem arises because of the separation of powers. When judges are engaged in
public policy activities for the executive, they are performing executive functions and their
mandates are wholly creatures of the executive.28 For the most part, the motives of governments
have been pure as they sought assistance from members of the judiciary to advise on particular
problems. However, at some level, there is a political component to the use of judges by the
executive that may be more or less apparent, depending on the circumstances.
On this political level, judicial independence may be used by governments for purposes that
are not connected to the core of the principle. Unmoored from its constitutional foundation of
the adjudication of disputes, judicial independence may be used for other political ends, namely
to deflect attention from the executive branch of government and to provide greater credibility
for both the process and the outcome of various non-judicial endeavours. Judges may be used to
give the whole process an “aura of independence” so that “the government-established
investigation gains the appearance of independence with a federal judge at the helm.”29 In sum,
judicial independence has become a valued political currency in Canada.
As a result of protections developed over time, one of the world’s strongest independent
judiciaries has arisen in Canada. The character of judicial independence in Canada has enabled
the executive branch of government, with the acquiescence of the judiciary, to use judicial
independence for other functions that are wholly unconnected to its purposes. Peter Russell has
been at the forefront of recognizing and explaining the unique nature of the exercises of judicial
power and the issues that arise with it.30 Other scholars followed in describing a “judicialization
of politics”. Michael Mandel has written about the “legalization of politics”,31 Ran Hirschl of
27

See e.g. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998), ch.
2 (Judicial Independence), cmt. 8 (acknowledging the particular risks of judges serving on public inquiries).

28

See Dixon v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Department of Canadian Forces in Somalia – Létourneau
Commission), [1997] F.C.J. No. 985, [1997] 3 F.C. 169 (C.A.) at paras. 12-13.

29

Tamar Witelson, “Declaration of Independence: Examining The Independence of Federal Public Inquiries” in
Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 301 at
350, 319. Cf. Peter H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1987) 12-13 (describing the “aura of impartiality” as one of the reasons for appointing judges to public
inquiries); Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Independence of
the Judiciary in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) 43 (noting that “the presence of a judge lends an
aura of reliability and impartiality to the inquiry which is very important”).

30
31

See e.g. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada, ibid.

See Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto:
Thomson Educational Publishing, 1994).
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the rise of a “juristocracy”32 and Robert Bork of the “worldwide rule of judges”.33 Each has in
common the assertion of an increase in judicial power through the transfer of disputes from the
political realm to the judicial.34 The phenomenon that I am describing is different. It is the
purposeful temporary deployment of judges by the executive for decidedly non-judicial
functions. This calculated government “rent-a-judge”35 strategy is explicitly intended to address
public policy issues. It does not involve using judges qua judges to adjudicate political disputes
to a certain political end, as Mandel, Hirschl, Bork and others describe. Rather, it involves the
use of judges by the executive in order to address public policy issues in order to enhance the
process or outcome with the trappings of judicial office and of judicial independence. The
executive branch draws upon the political capital of judicial independence aware that “the
knowledge that a judge is presiding over a public inquiry will add to the public perception that
the independence that judges enjoy will be imported into the inquiry context.”36 The executive
branch relies both on the public’s inability to distinguish between judges acting in judicial and
extra-judicial capacities and the judiciary’s acquiescence to this arrangement. This use of
judicial independence is especially important for fact-finding inquiries but is also useful for
controversial policy inquiries.37
Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the use of judges by the executive
to address a plethora of public policy issues. What is notable is not only the resurgence of the
popularity of public inquiries after a lull of a decade or so but also the expansion of the use of
32

See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

33

Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2002).

34

Mandel argues that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has led to a “legalization of politics” in the
sense of a transfer of policy making from the political to the legal sphere with concomitant anti-progressive results.
Mandel, supra note 31. Looking at the phenomenon on a global scale, Hirschl asserts that constitutional reform has
transferred power from representative institutions to courts. He contends that the constitutionalization process is the
result of a strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites, economic stakeholders and judicial
leaders in order to lock in political gains and insulate them from democratic politics. Hirschl, supra note 32. Robert
Bork sees the same phenomenon as Mandel and Hirschl but draws opposite conclusions. He argues that around the
world judicial activism has resulted in the judicialization of politics and morals with courts around the world siding
with left-wing political causes in the international culture wars. Bork, ibid.

35

To be clear, a sitting judge receives no additional remuneration for agreeing to serve on a commission of inquiry.
See Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. 57. The cost of the salary of the judge-commissioner is relatively minor in
comparison to the other costs associated with a commission of inquiry.

36

Tamar Witelson, “Declaration of Independence: Examining The Independence of Federal Public Inquiries” in
Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 301 at
349; Tamar Witelson, “Interview with Mr. Justice Gilles Letourneau: Somalia Commission Chair” in Allan Manson
& David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 361 at 367 (noting that
there is “great confusion” between the typical principles of judicial independence and those that apply when a judge
sits on a public inquiry).

37

On the distinction between “fact finding” and “policy” inquiries see O’Connor & Kristjanson, supra note 5 at 4-6.
The current trend is to combine both fact-finding and policy inquiries or to append a policy component onto what is
essential a fact-finding inquiry. This was the case in the Gomery Inquiry and the Mulroney-Schreiber Inquiry.
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judges for many public policy exercises on an ad hoc basis. Of further significance is the
acquiescence if not the implied support by the judiciary for such extra-judicial activities. The
phenomenon is a national one but in addition to the federal scene, I focus on Ontario as the
province with which I am most familiar. I turn first to the revival of judge-led public inquiries.

B. THE RESURGENCE OF PUBLIC INQUIRIES
Recent years have witnessed a renaissance in the popularity of public inquiries almost
invariably headed by judges, often active ones. In Canada, public inquiries have a long pedigree
that pre-dates Confederation in 1867.38 They have been termed “a quintessential Canadian
policy device”,39 “a time-honoured institutional mechanism for the formulation of public policy
in Canada”,40 “a particularly Canadian disease”,41 and have played an important role in Canadian
political history.42 However, until recently, they appeared to be headed for the endangered
political species list. A decade ago, commentators were lamenting the apparent demise of public
inquiries;43 they seemed to have fallen into disuse due to neglect or animus by political leaders,
both federal and provincial.44
However, over the past few years the popularity of public inquiries has rebounded. Since
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien left office in 2003, the federal Government has
established no fewer than six public inquiries, which often become associated with the judge or
38

See supra note 4.

39

A. Wayne Mackay, “Mandate, Legal Foundations, Powers and Conduct of Commissions of Inquiry” in A. Paul
Pross, Innis Christie & John A. Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 29 at 47.

40

Robert Centa & Patrick Macklem, “Securing Accountability through Commissions of Inquiry” A Role for the
Law Commission of Canada” in Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 79 at 79 (citing hundreds of reports).

41

Allan Manson & David Mullan, “Introduction” in Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise
or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 1 at 2.

42

See Nicholas d’Ombrain, “Public Inquiries in Canada” (1997) 40 Canadian Public Administration 86 at 87
(asserting that federal public inquiries “have marked, if not inspired, some of the pivotal moments in Canada’s
modern history…They have focused public attention in ways seldom achieved through the normal political process.
They have been used consciously to mould public opinion, and they have profoundly influenced the course of public
policy and the standards of public life.”). However, in retrospect, many public inquiries are more a matter of
political expediency than enduring policy or public value. See ibid. at 89 (noting that the Trudeau-Mulroney years
were marked by many policy inquiries but few important ones).

43

See ibid. at 81 (commenting that the capacity of the commission of inquiry to secure governmental accountability
“is beginning to falter”); John D. McCamus, “The Policy Inquiry: An Endangered Species?” in Allan Manson &
David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 211.

44

In particular, as discussed below, the federal Liberal government of Jean Chrétien and the Ontario provincial
government of Progressive Conservative Mike Harris both disfavoured public inquiries.
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leading figure at the center of the inquiry:45 Arar (announced in January 2004, reported in
September 2006), Gomery (February 2004, reports delivered in November 2005 and February
2006), Iacobucci (December 2006, report delivered October 2008),46 Air India (established May
2006, report expected 2009),47 Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(established April 2008, expected to last five years)48 and Mulroney-Schreiber (established June
2008).49 This represents an average of more than one per year, but as public inquiries extend
over the course of several years, there are often a number of public inquiries operating at once.
Thus, in the fall of 2008, Canadians were digesting the report of Mr. Justice Iacobucci in his
inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to three Canadians who were tortured
abroad,50 were awaiting the report of Mr. Justice Major in the Air India Inquiry, anticipating the
start of hearings in the inquiry into the dealings of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney with
German businessman and arms dealer Karlheinz Schreiber and watching the possible implosion
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Indian Residential Schools with the sudden and
dramatic resignation of its Chair, Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Harry LaForme.51 These only
cover the federally-appointed inquiries; as discussed below, several provincial inquiries were
ongoing during the same period. Thus, it is only half-jokingly that one Canadian Senator
quipped that working in Ottawa, “we have elections, budgets, Throne Speeches—just to fill the
time between inquiries.”52
A similar theme emerges from Canada’s largest province, Ontario, where the Progressive
Conservative government of Premier Mike Harris (1995-2003) shared with its federal Liberal
45

See Mackay, supra note 39 at 31.

46

Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati
and Muayyed Nureddin (Iacobucci Internal Inquiry), online: http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca

47

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (The Hon. John C. Major,
Q.C., Commissioner), online: http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/

48

Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission, online: http://www.trc-cvr.ca/indexen.html

49

Commission of Inquiry into Certain Allegations Respecting Business and Financial Dealings Between Karlheinz
Schreiber and the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney (The Hon. Jeffrey J. Oliphant, Commissioner), online:
http://www.oliphantcommission.ca

50

See Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad AbouElmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (Iacobucci Internal Inquiry), online: http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca. See Colin
Freeze, “Torture report urges Ottawa to better protect rights” (22 October 2008) Globe and Mail.

51

See Joe Friesen, “Resignation paralyzes residential schools commission” Globe and Mail (21 October 2008) A1;
Joe Friesen, Jacquie McNish & Bill Curry, “Native leaders divided over future of residential schools panel” Globe
and Mail (22 October 2008) A4; Joe Friesen, “AFN meddling blamed for exit of commission’s chairman” (23
October 2008) A1; Joe Friesen, “Judicial Independence key to LaForme’s resignation” Globe and Mail (24 October
2008) A4.

52

Mitchell Raphael, “Filling in Time Between Inquiries” Macleans (10 December 2007) 11 (The remark was
attributed to Senator Hugh Segal at the Churchill Society for the Advancement of Parliamentary Democracy’s 24th
annual dinner). Along similar lines, the National Post held a contest in 2007 inviting readers to come up with a
motto for Canada in six words or less. One of the top 10 nominees included “From inquiry to inquiry.” See “And
the winner is . . .” National Post (8 December 2007) (the winner was “Canada—a home for the world”).
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counterpart an antipathy towards public inquiries. For the duration of its two terms in
government, the Harris Government resisted calls for an inquiry into the 1995 shooting death of
Native protester Dudley George at Ipperwash Park. However, when seven people died and over
2,300 became sick from e-coli in the Town of Walkerton’s drinking water, Premier Harris
appointed Associate Chief Justice Dennis O’Connor to head a public inquiry. Justice
O’Connor’s administration of the public inquiry was widely praised and it quickly became the
gold standard against which future public inquiries were to be measured.53 It also became an
idealized model of a public inquiry: a strong and compassionate judge running an effective
public inquiry and delivering a relevant report within a reasonable period of time on a subject
that could not be considered “inside politics” or inherently partisan.54 At the end of the mandate
of Harris’s successor, Premier Ernie Eves, another public health crisis of international
proportions, SARS, led to the appointment of Justice Archie Campbell to head a commission of
inquiry on that subject.55
For eight years, Ontario’s provincial Liberal opposition had called for a public inquiry
into the death of Dudley George and promised in its 2003 election platform to convene one.
After it was elected in October 2003, one of the first acts of the new Liberal government in
Ontario was to appoint the former Chief Justice of Ontario’s provincial court, the Honourable
Sidney Linden, to head a public inquiry into events at Ipperwash and he was given a broad
mandate to also make recommendations regarding avoiding violence in similar circumstances.56
The Ontario Liberals followed soon after with the appointment of Justice Roland Haines to
conduct a review of Ontario’s meat inspection system.57 The Meat Review was then followed by
a full-fledged public inquiry into allegations of sexual abuse in Cornwall, Ontario58 and the

53

See Janice Tibbetts, “Judges’ roles in probes debated” The National Post (3 November 2008).

54

This inquiry had a partisan political element in that various political parties sought standing to argue that budget
cuts made by a particular political party in power were more responsible for lax regulation than budget cuts made
during their tenure in power.

55

See Order in Council 1230/2003 (Ontario), contained as Appendix B to the SARS Commission Interim Report,
online: http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/campbell04/campbell04.pdf

56

See Ministry of the Attorney General, Press Release, “Ontario Government Announces Public Inquiry into the
Death
of
Dudley
George”
(12
November
2003),
online:
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2003/20031112-ipperwash.asp. Some people saw Justice
Linden engaged in a mini-Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, a reference to the federal commission between
1991 and 1996 which produced a five-volume 4000 page report at a cost of $60 million. With the broad ranging
recommendations of the four volume Ipperwash Inquiry released in May 2007, three and a half years and $13.3
million later, there is some validity to this assertion. For all information related to the Ipperwash Inquiry see
www.ipperwashinquiry.ca

57

See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Press Release, “McGuinty Government Appoints Senior Judge to
Examine
and
Report
on
Meat
Inspection
System”
(9
January
2004),
online:
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2004/20040109-meat-nr.asp

58

The Cornwall Inquiry was appointed in April 2005. See generally http://www.cornwallinquiry.ca/en/. In October
2008, Ontario’s Attorney General set a deadline for the completion of hearings (January 2009) and the issuance of
the inquiry’s report (July 2009). See Canadian Press, “Ont. orders inquiry into sex abuse allegations in Cornwall to
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Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario headed by Justice Stephen Goudge who
delivered his report in October 2008.59 Earlier in the decade, the City of Toronto got into the act,
appointing a commission of inquiry into a computer leasing scandal.60
The story repeats itself across the country. In September 2008, the Saskatchewan
Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard released an 815 page
report at a cost of $10 million.61 Several years earlier Saskatchewan had held an inquiry into the
death of Neil Stonechild.62 In Manitoba, public inquiries into two wrongful convictions reported
in 2007 and 2008,63 while a commission of inquiry into the province’s child welfare systems is
expected to commence in 2009.64 British Columbia has also had two public inquiries over the
past several years: the Frank Paul Inquiry into the death of a Native man after being released
from police custody65 and an inquiry into the taser death of a Polish man at the Vancouver
International Airport.66 New Brunswick had not had a public inquiry in over a decade, when in
February 2008, the government established one to review the actions of a former pathologist in
more than 24,000 patient cases.67 In Newfoundland and Labrador, there have been public
wrap
up
by
July”
(23
Oct.
2008),
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5iH9vTc9RPMqMENt4pRA0XLFmI5Kw

online:

59

See Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario (The Hon. Stephen T. Goudge, Commissioner), online:
http://www.goudgeinquiry.ca/

60

Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry (The Hon. Madam Justice Denise Bellamy, Commissioner), online:
http://www.toronto.ca/inquiry/inquiry_site/index.html

61

See John Weidlich, “’The criminal justice system failed David Milgaard’: inquiry’s report”, CBC News (26
September 2008), online: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/09/26/milgaard-advance.html?ref=rss. See also The
Commission of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard (The Hon. Mr. Justice Edward P.
MacCallum, Commissioner), online: www.milgaardinquiry.ca.

62

See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Death of Neil Stonechild (The Hon. Mr.
Justice D.H. Wright, Commissioner) (2004), online: http://www.stonechildinquiry.ca/. Cf. Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Safety of the Public Drinking Water in the City of North Battleford,
Saskatchewan (The Hon. Robert D. Laing, Commissioner) (2002).

63

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell (Hon.
Patrick J. Lesage, Q.C., Commissioner) (2007), online: http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/; Report of the Taman Inquiry
into the Investigation and Prosecution of Derek Harvey-Zenk (The Hon. Roger Salhany, Q.C., Commissioner)
(2008), online: http://www.tamaninquiry.ca/.

64

See Commission of Inquiry into the Death of Phoenix Sinclair –per: Evidence Act; “Manitoba couple sentenced to
life
for
death
of
Phoenix
Sinclair”
CBCnews.ca
(12
December
2008),
online:
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/manitoba/story/2008/12/12/mb-sinclair-trial.html?ref=rss

65

See Inquiry into the Death of Frank Paul (The Hon. William H. Davies, Q.C., Commissioner), online:
http://www.frankpaulinquiry.ca/

66

See Braidwood Inquiries
http://www.braidwoodinquiry.ca/

67

(The

Hon.

Thomas

R.

Braidwood,

Q.C.,

Commissioner),

online:

See Commission of Inquiry into Pathology Services at the Miramichi Regional Health Authority (The Hon. Paul
S. Creaghan, Commissioner), online: http://www.miramichicommission.ca/index.html.
See Adam Huras,
“Authority blamed for letting Menon practice” (New Brunswick) Telegraph Journal (11 Dec. 2008) A2, online:
http://telegraphjournal.canadaeast.com/search/article/508446.
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inquiries into the administration of justice68 and faulty breast cancer test results69 while in Nova
Scotia a commission of inquiry investigated the youth criminal justice system.70. In each of
these cases, federal and provincial, the public inquiry was or is being headed by a judge. Amidst
all of this, Quebec stands as an outlier; not in its resistance to public inquiries but in its
willingness to hold public inquiries headed by non-judges.71
There is a certain paradox in using judges to head public inquiries. On a separation of
powers level, inquiries are instruments of the executive, yet they are most frequently headed by
judges.72 Often public inquiries are called “to remove an unpleasant controversy from the
political agenda.”73 It is generally recognized that there is a potential risk at least to the
individual judges who decide to head up a public inquiry. Canadian constitutional scholar
MacGregor Dawson explained this well in 1957 when he cautioned:
There would seem to be little purpose in taking elaborate care to separate
the judge from politics and to render him quite independent of the
executive, and then placing him in a position as a Royal Commissioner
where his impartiality may be attacked and his findings – no matter how
correct and judicial they may be – are liable to be interpreted as favouring
one political party at the expense of the other. For many of the inquiries

68

Lamer Inquiry Report into the Administration of Justice, online: http://www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/lamer/

69

Commission of Inquiry into Hormone Receptor Testing (The Hon. Justice Margaret A. Cameron, Commissioner),
online: http://www.cihrt.nl.ca/

70

Nunn Commission of Inquiry, Spiraling out of Control: Lessons Learned from a Boy in Trouble: Report of the
Nunn Commission of Inquiry (Nova Scotia: Nunn Commission of Inquiry, 2006). Speaking in October 2007 in
Nova Scotia, Justice O’Connor & Freya Kristjanson reported on two additional public inquiries in that province that
were then ongoing: one involving the remuneration of elected provincial officials, and another under the Municipal
Conflict of Interest Act. See O’Connor & Kristjanson, supra note 5.

71

For example, former Quebec Premier Pierre Marc Johnson headed a public inquiry into the collapse of an
overpass in Laval that resulted in the death of five persons. Historian and Sociologist Gérard Bouchard and
Philosopher Charles Taylor headed a very controversial commission into reasonable accommodation of religious
minorities in Quebec. See Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences,
online: http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/index.html. However, in December 2008, the Quebec government
appointed Quebec Court Judge Robert Sansfaçon to conduct a public inquiry into the shooting deaths of young men
from minority groups at the hands of the Montreal police. See Sue Montgomery, “Quebec launches public inquiry
into
Villanueva
shooting”
Montreal
Gazette
(2
December
2008),
online:
http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html?id=1018668&sponsor=

72

Allan Manson & David Mullan, “Introduction” in Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise
or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 1 at 5.

73

Robert Centa & Patrick Macklem, “Securing Accountability through Commissions of Inquiry” A Role for the
Law Commission of Canada” in Allan Manson & David Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 79 at 89 (citing P. Desbarats, “The Independence of Public Inquiries: Dixon v. Canada”
(1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 252 at 253).
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or boards place the judge in a position where he cannot escape
controversy: . . . 74
Professor Dawson’s warnings ring true today, over a half century after he wrote these
words. There is a real risk of judicial entanglement in highly political disputes when judges
agree to participate in public inquiries. In the United States, this recognition has led to an
established bar and bench to view judicial involvement in public inquiries as improper judicial
conduct.75 In Australia, the propriety of such judicial involvement is strongly contested, with
some even asserting that it is unconstitutional.76 Canada takes a different approach. While the
federal Judges Act generally prohibits extra-judicial activities, it allows them if they are
expressly authorized by legislation of the relevant federal or provincial legislature.77 To date,
Canadian judges and lawyers have not seriously addressed the separation of powers concerns
that have animated debates in other jurisdictions.78
The Canadian Judicial Council – the body statutorily charged with overseeing the
conduct of Canada’s federally appointed judges – acknowledged the issue over a decade ago. In
1998, it recognized the possible pitfalls of judges sitting on public inquiries in its ethical
guidelines for judges, stating that when judges are considering a request to serve as inquiry
commissioners, they “should think carefully about the implications for judicial independence of
74

MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957) 482.
Dawson further stated that “It has been proved time and again that it many of these cases the judge loses in dignity
and reputation, and his future is appreciably lessened thereby. Moreover, if the judge remains away from his regular
duties for very long periods, he is apt to lose his sense of balance and detachment; and he finds that the task of
getting back to normal and of adjusting his outlook and habits of mind to purely judicial work is by no means easy.”
Ibid. These passages from Dawson are quoted with approval by the Canadian Judicial council in its Ethical
Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998) ch. 4 (Judicial Independence), cmt. 8, n. 9.

75

American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), Rule 3.4 (“[a] judge shall not accept
appointment to a governmental committee or board, or other governmental position, unless it is one that concerns
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.”).

76

See Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (“Hindmarsh Island Bridge case”), [1996]
HCA 18, (1996) 189 CLR 1 (holding unconstitutional the appointment of a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia
to conduct a review of a case involving a claim that Aboriginal interests were affected by a proposed bridge). See
generally Sherman, “Should Judges Conduct Royal Commissions?” (1997) 8 PLR 5; Beatson, “Should Judges
Conduct Public Inquiries?” (2005) 121 LQR 221; Wheeler, “The Use of Federal Judges to Discharge Executive
Functions: The Justice Matthews Case” (1996) 11 AIAL Forum 1. Thanks to Greg Taylor for bringing these and
other sources to my attention.

77
78

See Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, ss. 55-56.

Over 20 years ago, the Canadian Bar Association recognized many of the potential problems with judges heading
public inquiries. See Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the
Independence of the Judiciary in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) 43. A Committee of the CBA
recommended that generally judges should not be asked to participate in commissions of inquiry except where “the
nature of the matter under investigation makes the choice of a judge as a commissioner of inquiry particularly
appropriate.” Ibid. at 59. This CBA Committee seemed to be recommending that the default rule be that a judge not
participate in a commission of inquiry. This discussion was part of a broader report on the independence of the
judiciary undertaken in the context of proposed statutory and constitutional reforms which did not come to fruition.
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accepting the appointment.”79 The Canadian Judicial Council noted that there were examples of
“Judicial Commissioners becoming embroiled in public controversy and being criticized and
embarrassed by the very governments that appointed them.” The guideline concluded by
recommending that the terms of reference and other conditions “should be examined carefully so
as to assess their compatibility with the judicial function.”80 This is good advice, but there is
little indication that it has been followed. Moreover, the guidelines also indicate that individual
judges who are approached to serve as commissioners should consult with their chief justices.
This indicates that the decision to serve as a commissioner has both an individual and an
institutional component and that both elements should be considered in a decision by a particular
judge to serve as a commissioner.
The guidelines referred to above were the result of a resolution adopted by the Canadian
Judicial Council in March 1998 entitled “Position of the Canadian Judicial Council on the
Appointment of Federally-Appointed Judges to Commissions of Inquiry” which provided more
specific guidance on this issue.81 This statement had a number of relevant components: (1) every
request for a judge to take on an extra-judicial function should be made in first instance to the
chief justice of the relevant court; (2) such request should be accompanied by a reference to the
statutory authority for the proposed appointment; (3) the request be accompanied with the
proposed terms of reference for the inquiry and indication of the time limit for it; (4) sufficient
time be given for the chief justice to discuss fully the request with the relevant judge whose
services are requested; (5) the chief justice, in consultation with the judge in question, should
consider whether the judge’s absence would significantly impair the work of the court; and (6)
the chief justice and the judge should consider whether accepting the proposed appointment
could impair the future work of the judge as a member of the court.82 In particular, they should
consider:
• Whether the subject-matter of the inquiry essentially requires advice on public policy or
involves issues of an essentially partisan nature;
• Whether it essentially involves an investigation into the conduct of agencies of the
appointing government;
• Whether the inquiry is essentially an investigation of whether particular individuals have
committed a crime or a civil wrong;
• Who is to select commission counsel and staff;
• Whether the proposed judge is specially required for this inquiry, through particular
knowledge or experience, or whether a retired or supernumerary judge would be suitable;
and
79

Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998), ch. 2
(Judicial Independence), cmt. 8.

80

Ibid.

81

Canadian Judicial Council, Position of the Canadian Judicial on the Appointment of Federally-Appointed Judges
to Commissions of Inquiry, approved at is March 1998 mid-year meeting, online: http://www.cjcccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_other_PositionCJC_1998_en.pdf.

82

Ibid.
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If the inquiry requires a legally-trained commissioner, should the court feel obliged to
provide a judge or could a senior lawyer perform this function equally well?83

After the Canadian Judicial Council’s statement was adopted, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, as
head of the Council, sent a memorandum to all First Ministers expressing concerns about the use
of federally-appointed judges as commissioners in public inquiries on both independence and
operational grounds and attaching the statement.
The Canadian Judicial Council’s actions in 1998 were an excellent recognition of the
problems associated with extra-judicial activities of judges. However, the actions of the
Canadian Judicial Council and the Chief Justice in 1998 coincided with what turned out to be a
period of hiatus in public inquiries and the warnings seemed to have disappeared into the wind.
As discussed above, this was a period during which the leaders of the two largest governments in
Canada expressed a strong antipathy towards public inquiries.84 As discussed in the next section,
there is good reason to revisit Chief Justice Lamer’s memorandum and the Canadian Judicial
Council’s guidelines and take their warnings seriously.
Moreover, the Canadian Judicial Council’s guidelines give the misleading impression
that public inquiries are set up through a careful process of deliberation and consultation. While
this may be the case, it rarely is so.85 More often than not, public inquiries are established under
the heat of political pressure and the selection of the judge becomes a matter of political urgency
83

Ibid.

84

In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien explained at length: “For the opposition parties, calling for a
public inquiry is usually an easy way to dig up dirt or keep a hot issue on the front burner after they’ve exhausted
their own supply of facts and questions. For the government, giving in to the calls is often a mechanism to do
nothing, to dodge responsibility, or to postpone a controversial decision until after the next election. Very few of
these inquiries in my experience have ever been of much use, and those few were valuable only because they didn’t
turn into television soap operas. If there’s a problem, you should face up to it and make a decision. If you need
more information, you can always ask the department to give you a full report. If you need an independence point
of view, you can ask someone to carry out an investigation without a lot of fanfare, as happened when I asked
Robert Nixon, a former Treasurer of Ontario, to look into the circumstances around the Tories’ deal to privatize
Toronto’s Pearson International Airport, which had been an issue in the 1995 election campaign. If you want to
examine a broad social issue, you can set up a royal commission, as we did with health. But it is in the nature of
public inquiries to get turned into show trials, kangaroo courts, and political entertainment. The rules of evidence
don’t have to be respected as they are in a court. There’s not the same right of due process or even the same process
to protect the innocent during the investigation into a possible wrong-doing. Scores of reputations are shattered for
not good cause; people lose their jobs merely because their names happened to be mentioned in passing; and the
entire public service is tarred by gossip and innuendo.” See Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister (Toronto:
Alfred A. Knopf , 2007) 187-88. This statement was written at a time during which the former Prime Minister was
embattled in litigation against Judge Gomery so they should not be automatically accepted at face value. See
Chrétien v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Gomery
Commission), [2008] F.C.J. No. 973, 2008 FC 802 [Chrétien v. Canada]. However, Mr. Chrétien’s pattern of
resistance towards public inquiries during the course of his prime ministership (1993-2003) lends credence to his
assertions above.

85

See d’Ombrain, supra note 5 at 93 (stating that most investigative commissions of inquiry are set up very quickly,
usually in response to intolerable political pressure and are invariably headed by judges).
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and expediency rather than a policy ideal.86 Since the Canadian Judicial Council’s statement was
issued over a decade ago, there has been no publicly acknowledged instance of either a
provincial or federal government being unable to obtain the necessary approvals in order to get a
federally-appointed judge to head a commission of inquiry. While certainly it is likely the case
that chief justices have been unwilling to release particular judges due to judicial workload and
that individual judges have turned down governments’ requests to head a public inquiry, there
always appears to be a judge willing to take on the task with the approval of his or her chief
justice. At the end of the day, that is usually what governments are seeking: a generic judge that
can then be used by governments in order to attach the label “independent” to the inquiry being
established. In fact, this is how the calling of most public inquiries work in practice. First, the
government announces its intention to call a public inquiry which is often referred to as “a
judicial inquiry”; subsequently, they announce the name of the judge and the terms of reference.
In most cases, the judge is unknown to the public and to the press and information about who
that person is comes out later; who they are is secondary to what they are – a judge who carries
the political capital of judicial independence that immediately gives the process credibility as
“independent”.87 Despite the obvious pitfalls for judges and for the judiciary in heading public
inquiries, extrajudicial functions of judges have continued to expand in Canada over the past
decade as discussed in the next section.

C. BEYOND PUBLIC INQUIRIES: JUDGES FOR EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
There is a long history in Canada of assigning judges to extra-judicial functions beyond
the realm of public inquiries The most notable such responsibility is the appointment of the
Chief Justice of Canada as Deputy Governor General, or in the case of the absence or
unavailability of the Chief Justice, the most senior available puisne justice. This appointment
was formalized in the 1947 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of
Canada.88 The Governor General exercises both legislative powers (the granting of royal assent
for all legislation) as well as executive ones (e.g. selection of the Prime Minister, prorogation,
the dissolution of Parliament). Her role is largely ceremonial and the powers that she exercises
are almost exclusively based on the advice of her ministers, notably the Prime Minister.
However, in critical constitutional situations such as the one that Canada faced in late 2008, the

86

See ibid. (“The decisions about these inquiries and selection of commissioners is often made in a disorderly
way.”).
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Exceptions exist where governments do in fact seek the expertise of a particular judge. The federal Government’s
appointment of Associate Chief Justice Dennis O’Connor to conduct the Arar Inquiry is case in point and likely
resulted from Justice O’Connor’s successful handling of the Walkerton Inquiry in Ontario.

88

Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, art. VIII (1947), reprinted in Bernard W.
Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canadian Constitutional Documents Consolidated, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
Thomson/Carswell, 2007) 346 at 348.
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Governor General is called upon to exercise her independent discretion as to how to act.89 And if
she were unavailable or out of the country, the Chief Justice (or another Supreme Court justice)
would exercise such decidedly non-judicial powers.90 The provinces have followed this model
with their Chief Justices filling the Lieutenant-Governor’s role in case of absence or
unavailability.
Similarly, judges have long headed electoral boundary commissions in Canada. This
function is not a new one and unlike public inquiries, the mandate, duration and operation of
such commissions follow a general and predictable format.91 Because of their direct link to
electoral politics, electoral boundary commissions are transparently political and the
opportunities for political involvement are established and predictable: testimony during such
commissions and the legislature’s response after the commissions deliver their report. Recent
scrapes between the government and electoral commission in British Columbia, highlight the
political stakes in the process. 92
In recent years, there has been a significant expansion of the use of judges, retired and
active, for both administrative and executive functions. Especially notable is the dramatic
expansion of judges for public policy roles outside of public inquiries. This judicialization of the
policy and administrative spheres is a function of both supply and demand. On the supply side, a
larger pool of former federally-appointed judges has developed due to early and active
retirements.93 The nature of judicial retirement has changed, as has the character of retirement
generally in society. The old model of the retired judge was of the eminence grise who perhaps
joined a law firm and dispensed wise counsel to younger lawyers or gave after dinner speeches at
bar association functions. The new model of judicial retirement is of an active second career,
either back at the bar or in the realm of public policy.
On the demand side, there are a number of reasons why such judges are especially
popular choices for governments. The demand for actors outside of government such as judges
to conduct both targeted and general policy reviews has increased as the supply of other possible
89

See generally Peter H. Russell & Lorne M. Sossin, eds., Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis: The Dilemmas,
Choices and Future of Parliamentary Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming
2009). The most famous case is of course the King-Byng Crisis of 1926. See Eugene Forsey, The Royal Power of
Dissolution in the Commonwealth (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1938). On another issue see e.g. Adam M.
Dodek, “Rediscovering Constitutional Law: Succession upon the Death of the Prime Minister” (2000) 49 UNBLJ
33.
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At the least it is notable that there has been no serious discussion as to the propriety of the Chief Justice (or a
puisne judge) exercising such non-judicial functions, on separation of powers and other grounds.
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See generally John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).
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See CBC News, “BC Liberals promise free vote over cuts to rural ridings” (15 February 2008), online:
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2008/02/15/bc-free-vote-on-ridings.html
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By virtue of s. 99(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, federally-appointed judges must retire at age 75. Similar
restrictions exist for provincial court judges. See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, s. 47.
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candidates to conduct such reviews has declined over time. Across Canada, the independent
policy making capacity of non-governmental actors was dealt a heavy blow in the last decade of
the last century and the first decade of this century. Federal and provincial governments
disbanded law commissions and reduced funding to other arm’s length organizations that
produced policy work. Canada has never had the same level of strong independent public policy
think tanks as in the United States. Canada has good public policy institutes, but no equivalents
to the Rand Corporation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institute or the Pew
Research Center which have exerted a strong influence on the formation of American policy.94
Political parties have very limited research and policy capabilities95 and the internal policymaking capacities of governments were weakened during government cutbacks in the 1990s. At
the same time, governments have been unwilling to use legislative tools such as committees of
the Legislature in order to engage in investigative or policy-making functions, due in part to the
decline in public perceptions of our elected officials.96 In sum, in Canada, the public policy
capacities both inside and outside government are limited or have weakened and a strong
negative perception exists regarding government’s ability to address an issue whenever a specific
problem arises. Government institutions have weakened in favour of the rise of a cadre of
“independent” officials and bodies and the use of judges for such activities falls within this
category.
In the realm of administrative functions, retired judges are favored for new positions that
have been created across the country such as parliamentary ethics or integrity officers,97 and
94

See e.g. Alex Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The Rand Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire (Orlando:
Harcourt, 2008). See generally Donald E. Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006); Donald E. Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the
Impact of Public Policy Institutes (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Donald E.
Abelson, "Public Visibility and Policy Relevance: Assessing the Impact and Influence of Canadian Policy Institutes"
(1999) 42 Canadian Public Administration 240; Donald E. Abelson & Christine M. Carberry, "Following Suit or
Falling Behind? A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States" (1998) 31 Canadian
Journal of Political Science 525; and Evert Lindquist, "Think Tanks or Clubs? Assessing the Influence and Roles of
Canadian Policy Institutes" (1993) 36 Canadian Public Administration 547.
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See e.g. Irvin Studin, “Revisiting the Democratic Deficit: The Case for Political Party Think Tanks” Policy
Options (February 2008) 62, online: http://www.irpp.org/po/

96

Over the past decade, Léger Marketing has published an annual “Profession Barometer” which asks Canadians
whether they trust members of particular professions. Politicians consistently ranked dead last in this poll with
ratings in the teens until 2007 when Leger split the category of “Car Salespeople” into “New car salespeople” and
“Used car salespeople”, which had the effect of lifting politicians out of the basement, barely: Percentage of
Canadians who trust . . . Firefighters (97%) . . . Judges (74%) . . . Lawyers (54%) . . . New car salespeople (35%) . . .
Politicians (15%) . . . Used car salespeople (12%). There are 23 categories in all. See Leger Marketing, “Profession
Barometer” (2007), online: http://www.legermarketing.com/documents/SPCLM/070522ENG.pdf
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In Ontario, the Integrity Commissioner was established in 1988 to review the conduct of Members of the
Provincial Parliament (MPP). The first three Integrity Commissioners were each retired judges: the Hon. Robert C.
Rutherford (Dec. 1, 1997-March 4, 2001); the Hon. Gregory T. Evans (June 29, 1988-Nov. 30, 1997; March 5,
2001-Sept. 16, 2001); and the Hon. Coulter A.A. Osborne (Sept. 17, 2001-July 31, 2007). Currently a non-judge is
the
Acting
Integrity
Commissioner.
See
http://integrity.oico.on.ca/oic/OICweb2.nsf/IntegrityCommissionerEn?OpenPage. There used to be a separate
Conflict of Interest Commissioner designated for the staff of MPPs and retired judges held this position but now the
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child advocates.98 In Ontario, they have also become popular choices as appointees to
administrative tribunals such as the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario,99 the Ontario Review
Board,100 the Consent and Capacity Board101 and the Ontario Securities Commission.102 Judges
are natural candidates for such offices because they often involve the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.
In addition, the executive is also increasingly turning to judges to conduct various sorts of
reviews which fall short of public inquiries. These share some characteristics of public inquiries,
however judicial reliance on the executive is usually much greater in terms of support, research,
budget, staffing, etc. On these sorts of reviews, it is useful to distinguish between “targeted
reviews” which relate to a specific incident or issue and broader policy reviews. On targeted
reviews, a retired judge advised the federal Minister of Justice on the possible wrongful
conviction of Stephen Truscott.103 After the federal Minister ordered a reference to the Court of
Integrity Commissioner has jurisdiction for both MPPs and their staff. The new Conflict of Interest Commissioner
has jurisdiction over the Public Service and the first person appointed to this role is the Hon. Sydney Linden who,
among other things, was the Commissioner for the Ipperwash Inquiry. In both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the
Conflict of Interest Commissioner is currently a retired judge. See “Profile”, New Brunswick Conflict of Interest
Commissioner (The Hon. Patrick A.A. Ryan), online: http://www.gnb.ca/legis/conflict/profile-e.asp and Nova Scotia
House of Assembly, “Conflict of Interest Commissioner” (The Hon. D. Merlin Nunn), online:
http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/house_of_assembly/conflict.html. In other provinces, while a non-judge currently
holds office, prior occupants have been judges.
98

In British Columbia, the government established the office of the Representative for Child and Youth after an
independent review conducted by the Hon. Ted Hughes. An all-party committee of the Legislature appointed Judge
Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond of the Saskatchewan Provincial Court as the first Representative. See British Columbia,
Representative for Child and Youth, History, online: http://www.rcybc.ca/Content/AboutRCY/History.asp. Judge
Turpel-Lafond is on a five year leave of absence from her court. See British Columbia, Representative for Child and
Youth,
Mary
Ellen
Turpel-Lafond,
online:
http://www.rcybc.ca/Images/Who%20We%20Are/METL%20Bio%20Final.pdf.
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Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Peter Cory and former Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Alvin Rosenberg
were past members of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. See Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, List of
Members, online: http://www.hrto.ca/NEW/about/members.asp (listing the Hon. Alvin Rosenberg, Q.C. as a
member as of January 31, 2009).
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The Ontario Review Board is currently chaired by Mr. Justice Douglas Carruthers. Its members include retired
judges Justices Michael Forestell, Douglas Coo, John McCombs, John O’Driscoll, Nicholson McRae as well as
former Master of the Superior Court, Ross Linton See Ontario Review Board, Agency Members Biographies,
online: https://www.pas.gov.on.ca/scripts/en/bios.asp?minID=49&boardID=853&persID=112277#1.
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Ontario’s Consent and Capacity Board is chaired by Justice Edward Ormston. Vice Chairs include former Chief
Justice of the Ontario Superior Court, the Hon. Patrick LeSage. Its members include retired justice Douglas Coo.
See
Ontario,
Consent
and
Capacity
Board,
Agency
Members
Biographies,
online:
https://www.pas.gov.on.ca/scripts/en/bios.asp?minID=49&boardID=876&persID=136003#1
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Former Chief Justice Patrick LeSage is a Commissioner of the Ontario Securities Commission. See

http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/Commission/ga_commission_members.jsp#pjles
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In 2002, Minister of Justice Martin Cauchon appointed retired Justice Fred Kaufman to conduct a review. See
Canada, Department of Justice, “Backgrounder: Stephen Truscott Wrongful Conviction Application”, online
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2004/doc_31272.html
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Appeal of Ontario which found that a miscarriage of justice had occurred,104 the provincial
Attorney General appointed a retired judge to advise him on compensation for Mr. Truscott.105
Similarly, after the Bernardo trial and a very controversial plea bargain made by the Crown in
that case, the Attorney General of Ontario appointed a sitting judge to review the prosecution of
the case.106
Turning to broader policy reviews, Ontario tapped former Chief Justice Patrick LeSage to
conduct a review and make recommendations regarding civilian oversight of the police and then
several years later returned to Justice LeSage and asked him to undertake a similar task with
regard to long criminal trials.107 On the civil side, Justice Coulter Osborne conducted a Civil
Justice Review for the Ontario Government108 while former Chief Justice McMurtry was kept
busy conducting reviews of victim compensation109 and youth justice.110
In most cases, the judges involved in these and other administrative functions worked
diligently to produce first-class work of great value to the development of public policy or the
better understanding of a particular issue or event. In such cases, no damage is done to judicial
independence, even if the government can be said to have appropriated the virtue of judicial
independence for a particular policy exercise. However, when things do go wrong, there is
potential for judicial independence to be degraded as a result. Two such examples are discussed
in the next section.
104

See R. v. Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575, [2007] O.J. No. 3221.
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In August 2007, the Attorney General of Ontario appointed the Hon. Sydney Robins to advise him on the issue of
compensation for Mr. Truscott. See the Hon. Sydney L. Robins, Q.C., In the Matter of Stephen Truscott: Advisory
Opinion
on
the
Issue
of
Compensation
(2008),
online:
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/truscott/robins_report.pdf. See also Tracey Tyler,
“Court acquits Truscott” The Toronto Star (28 August 2007). The Government of Ontario accepted Judge Robins
recommendations and awarded Mr. Truscott $6.5 million. See Robert Benzie, “Truscott’s legal nightmare ends”
The Toronto Star (8 July 2008).
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See A. Campbell, The Bernardo Investigation Review: Report of Justice Archie Campbell (Toronto: The Review,
1996) described by Justice Archie Campbell, “The Bernardo Investigation Review” in Allan Manson & David
Mullan, Commission of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 381.
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See The Hon. Patrick J. LeSage, Q.C., Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of
the Attorney General, 2005), online: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/LeSage/ and
The Hon. Patrick J. LeSage, CM, Q.C. & Professor Michael Code, Report of the Review of Large and Complex
Criminal
Case
Procedures
(Toronto:
Ministry
of
the
Attorney
General,
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The Hon. Coulter A.A. Osborne, Q.C., Civil Justice Reform Project: Summary of Findings & Recommendations
(November 2007), online: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/.
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IV. CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE USE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSES
In the previous section, I discussed some general reasons for the use of judges outside
their traditional adjudicative role and some of the problems that may arise in this context. In this
section, I use two case studies, one involving a public inquiry and one involving another type of
extra-judicial function, to demonstrate how judicial independence can be damaged through such
extra-judicial activities.

A. THE SPONSORSHIP INQUIRY
While only several years old, the Sponsorship Inquiry headed by Quebec Superior Court
Justice John Gomery has quickly become a textbook case study in how a judge should not run a
public inquiry. More interesting than Judge Gomery’s personal actions however, is the question
whether the Gomery Inquiry represents an example of a public policy area in which judges
should not tread at all. The Sponsorship Scandal was not qualitatively or quantitatively different
from other political scandals that have beset Canadian governments – Liberal and Conservative –
over the past decades. It was triggered by the report of the Auditor General of Canada into the
misuse of government funds for advertising on sponsorship activities in Quebec after the near
death experience of the Quebec Referendum of 1995. In the face of scandals of a certain
magnitude it becomes routine for the opposition to call for “a full public inquiry” into the
scandal. Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien successfully avoided such attacks on a number of
files: Shawiniganate, Air India and the Human Resources Development Corporation (HRDC)
(aka “the Billion Dollar Boondoogle”). The decision to call a public inquiry into the sponsorship
scandal was a conscious political choice made by a new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, eager to
distinguish his administration from the politics of his predecessor. Ultimately, the public inquiry
contributed to the fall of Martin’s Liberal government in January 2006 and the return to power of
the Conservatives led by Stephen Harper.
The decision to call a public inquiry into the Sponsorship Scandal was a transparent
attempt by a new government to use the trappings of judicial office in the attempt to cleanse the
taint of political scandal. This decision is widely acknowledged to have been a political
miscalculation of monumental proportions.111 Not only was the Gomery Inquiry a political

111

See e.g. Chantal Hébert, French Kiss: Stephen Harper’s Blind Date with Quebec (Toronto: Vintage Canada,
2007) 28-30; Ruth Hubbard & Gilles Paquet, Gomery’s Blinders and Canadian Federalism (Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press, 2007) 7-8; Paul Wells, Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper’s New
Conservatism (Toronto: Douglas & Gibson, 2006) 95-102; 259-62; Eddie Goldenberg, The Way it Works: Inside
Ottawa (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2006) 240.
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failure, it was a judicial failure as well.112 Its most memorable legacies are tawdry but
entertaining political theatre; even the serious policy issues appended to the inquiry’s mandate
could not elevate the inquiry from the political street. The Gomery Inquiry ended with the
ignominious result of a finding that Justice Gomery was biased against former Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien and the conclusions relating to Mr. Chrétien were voided.113 Ultimately, the
actions of Commissioner Gomery tarnished the reputation of the inquiry, of himself and possibly
of the Canadian judiciary. In short, the Gomery Inquiry chipped away at the political capital of
judicial independence. This came about through a series of actions by Judge Gomery which
displayed a serious lack of judgment, the essential judicial quality.
Justice Gomery began the inquiry with a strategic error in hiring Bernard Roy as his
Chief Commission Counsel. Mr. Roy is a respected lawyer who had served as Chief
Commission Counsel to another commission and was eminently qualified for the job but his
appointment was problematic for two reasons. To be clear, both reasons raised problems relating
to the appearance of impartiality rather than any questions as to the actual impartiality of Mr.
Roy or of Judge Gomery. First, as the former Chief of Staff to Conservative Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, Mr. Roy in his role as Chief Commission Counsel would be targeting former
Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, his former boss’s political nemesis. This appointment
increased rather than lessened the politicization of the inquiry.114 Second, Mr. Roy was a partner
in the same law firm as Justice Gomery’s daughter which created an appearance that a member
of Justice Gomery’s family was indirectly benefiting from his appointment. In a less politicallycharged inquiry, it is unlikely that this would have mattered much. However, in this inquiry, it
further exacerbated a highly-charged political climate, even more so when Justice Gomery’s
daughter became the subject of evidence before the inquiry by Prime Minister Chrétien in the
attempt to embarrass Justice Gomery.
Next, Judge Gomery made a serious error in giving media interviews during the course of
the inquiry in advance of the testimony of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and other witnesses.
This action demonstrated a lack of judgment and ultimately led the Federal Court to declare that
it served as the basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias against Mr. Chrétien.115 It was Judge
Gomery’s most critical and most enduring misstep. In the course of the interview, the Judge
descended into the ring and engaged in combat with one of the key persons under investigation
112

Cf. Hubbard & Paquet, ibid. at 8-9 (“Gomery was led to mount a seriously flawed inquiry—thrust as he was into
the overheated situation of a daily soap opera fraught with political gamesmanship without clear rules of evidence to
assist him in sifting through conflicting testimony and with an insufficient understanding of the complex apparatus
of government decision making.”).
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who had yet to testify.116 In so doing, the Judge appeared more like a participant than an
independent arbiter. Not surprisingly, given his storied reputation as a fighter, Mr. Chrétien
saved his response for his public and dramatic inquiry testimony in which it is widely
acknowledged that he got the best of Judge Gomery, further converting the inquiry into political
theatre rather than a serious policy endeavour. To be fair to Judge Gomery, he was taking on the
role of inquisitor that he had been asked to assume in this inquiry which was a departure from the
ideal type of the neutral judge. His conduct of the inquiry as inquisitor demonstrates the
potential problems when we ask judges to move from arbitrators of disputes to inquisitors
conducting public inquiries.
Third, Judge Gomery allowed or encouraged his Director of Communications to write a
book about the internal workings of the inquiry, aptly titled Inside Gomery.117 Judge Gomery
wrote the forward in which he attested to the veracity of the book’s contents118 which were
critical of the parties and of commission counsel at times. The book itself was introduced as
evidence of Judge Gomery’s bias in applications for judicial review of his Commission
Report.119 Inside Gomery is an interesting account of the process but it makes the inquiry look
more like a political soap opera than a serious policy endeavour. It further exposes the chasm
between the judicial role and the non-judicial nature of public inquiries; it would be considered
beyond a breach of protocol or a lapse of judgment for a judge to permit let alone endorse the
publication that revealed the inner workings of a particular judicial proceeding.
Fourth, Justice Gomery became an advocate for his report after it was completed. Justice
Gomery spoke out publicly when he felt that the Harper Government (which had inherited the
inquiry from its predecessor) was dragging its heals on the implementation of his
recommendations.120 He testified before a parliamentary committee on issues relating to his
report.121 In the past, other commissioners had become advocates for the implementation of
their reports, but not in recent history; some judges have clearly stated that commissioners
116
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should not adopt an advocate’s role respecting their reports.122 While by this time Judge Gomery
had retired from the bench and was back to being “an ordinary citizen”, the difficulty was that
Justice Gomery’s actions compounded an already problematic situation. Moreover, Judge
Gomery continued to attack the Harper government, criticizing the Prime Minister for delaying
in calling a public inquiry into the Mulroney-Schreiber affair.123

B. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ABORTION, AND THE ORDER OF CANADA
Outside of public inquiries, there are other extra-judicial functions that governments
assign to judges in the attempt to cloak political decisions with an aura of independence removed
from the taint of the politics. The apolitical façade usually holds but at times it breaks down and
when it does, the political nature of such decisions is readily apparent. The involvement of the
Chief Justice of Canada in the selection of members for the Order of Canada, Canada’s highest
honour, is a case in point.
The purpose of the Order of Canada is to recognize Canadians for their outstanding
contributions to their communities, to Canada and to humanity. There are three levels in the
Order of Canada: members, officers and companions. The qualifications for induction to the
Order of Canada are “distinguished service in or to a particular community, group or field of
activity” (member); “achievement and merit of a high degree, especially service to Canada or to
humanity at large” (officer); and outstanding achievement and merit of the highest degree,
especially in service to Canada or to humanity at large” (companion, the highest level within the
Order).124 These criteria are inherently subjective and no further formal guidelines exist to guide
the decision making process. The selection of members involves an exercise of political
judgment in terms of making decisions as to which type of activities in which fields warrant
recognition. There is also a sensitivity to the national character of the Order; each announcement
of new members of the Order includes persons from all across Canada. More troubling for its
legitimacy, the Order of Canada has been criticized for “political correctness”125 or “leftist
leanings”.126 Such accusations have been dismissed by the leading scholar on the Order,127 but
122
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the composition of the Advisory Council on the Order may explain why persons from the arts,
academia and government are favoured recipients of the Order. The persons who recommend
candidates to receive the Order are the Clerk of the Privy Council (the top federal Civil Servant
in Canada); the Deputy Minister of the Department of Canadian Heritage; the Chairperson of the
Canada Council; the President of the Royal Society of Canada; the Chairperson of the Board of
Directors of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada; and five members of the
Order appointed on the recommendation of the other members of the Advisory Council. The
Chief Justice of Canada chairs the Advisory Committee.128
It is not readily apparent why the Chief Justice of Canada – or any judge – should be a
part of, let alone chair, this body. It is not a judicial body. Certainly, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is a national figure and we would expect such person to be well-versed in
national affairs and well-placed to exercise judgment on the contributions of worthy Canadians
to our society. But that is inherently a political decision, not a judicial one.129
The decisions regarding the Order are inherently political – not in the sense of being
partisan130-- but in the sense of being an exercise of discretion that reflects a judgment about the
relative value of the contributions of various individuals to Canadian society.131 To give a recent
and high-profile example, in 2008 the Advisory Committee recommended long-time abortion
activist Dr. Henry Morgentaler for the Order of Canada. The controversial nature of this
appointment ripped away the usual non-political façade that surrounds the Order.132 In the 1970s
and 1980s as Dr. Morgentaler was challenging the Criminal Code of Canada’s restrictions on
abortion in the courts, a pro-life crusader named Joseph Borowski was also challenging them as
insufficiently protective of the rights of the unborn foetus.133 In awarding the Order of Canada to
127
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University of Toronto Press, 2005).
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Dr. Morgentaler but not to Mr. Borowski or a similarly high profile pro-life activist,134 the
Advisory Committee chaired by the Chief Justice of Canada may be perceived as taking sides in
one of the most divisive social debates in Canada.135 The political nature of the appointment was
apparent in politicians’ responses, with Liberal leader Stéphane Dion claiming, in a phrase more
akin to the politician’s standard responses to judicial decisions, that politics should be kept out of
the Order of Canada process and calling on Canadians to “respect and celebrate” the decisions of
the panel and the Governor General.136 The Conservative Government’s strategy was to distance
itself from the Order of Canada appointment process and the Government issued talking points
along such lines. In fact, Government statements specifically noted that the selection of the
Order of Canada was an independent process and explicitly mentioned that the Chief Justice
chaired the Advisory Committee.137 That is, the Government was able to distance itself from the
selection of Dr. Morgentaler by invoking the independence of the Chief Justice of Canada.
Consequently, the Advisory Committee and the Chief Justice in particular, were thrust into the

C.R. (3d) 223, appeal dismissed as moot [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342. See generally F.L. Morton, Morgentaler versus Borowski:
Abortion, the Charter, and the Courts (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993).
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centre of the firestorm of controversy, potentially undermining judicial independence in the
process.138
The potential harm to judicial independence was raised in some of the responses to the
announcement of Dr. Morgentaler’s appointment. Some accused the Chief Justice of taking
sides in the abortion debate and questioning whether she could be impartial in adjudicating future
abortion-related cases. A coalition of pro-life groups launched a complaint against the Chief
Justice with the Canadian Judicial Council.139 The Chief Justice of Canada responded by taking
the highly unusual step of publicly rejecting the accusations of bias and defending her role in the
Order of Canada process. The Chief Justice explained her role as follows: "I'm there to make
sure the meeting runs well and fairly and that the vote is taken fairly – and not to weigh in for, or
against, any particular candidate".140 If this is the case, it further demonstrates the lack of
connection between her role as chair and any judicial expertise. Her role then has no operational
significance, but has great symbolic and political value. The participation of the Chief Justice
may help enhance the perception of the non-political and independent nature of the Order of
Canada but at a cost to judicial independence. At the same time and venue as the Chief Justice
of Canada was explaining her role in the Order of Canada, the Chief Justice of Manitoba opined
that some extrajudicial functions may undermine the judicial role and that perhaps judges should
reconsider the advisability of acting in such capacities.141 To be clear, the Chief Justice of
Canada has no such option regarding the Order of Canada. She is required to Chair the Advisory
Council under the Constitution of the Order.142 It would require a change to that constitution to
free the Chief Justice of this responsibility. And it should be so amended.143
It is not clear what is functionally gained in having the Chief Justice of Canada chair the
advisory committee beyond strengthening the non-partisan nature of the award and attempting to
create the appearance that the process is a non-political one. However, as the Morgentaler
138
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episode demonstrates, there is a risk that the involvement of the Chief Justice in this process can
undermine judicial independence.

C. THE LONG TERM IMPACT
The Gomery Inquiry and the Chief Justice’s involvement in the awarding of the Order of
Canada to Dr. Henry Morgentaler are only two of a larger group of recent examples of judicial
activity outside of the courtroom that threatens to damage the valuable societal good of judicial
independence. Other examples include the October 2008 resignation of Justice Harry LaForme,
Canada’s highest serving Aboriginal judge, as Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission into Indian Residential Schools because he feared outside rather than governmental
interference with his independence144 and the decision by Ontario’s Attorney General that same
week to shut down the Cornwall Inquiry after three years and $37 million.145
The potential harms to judicial independence are both individual and institutional. It has
long been recognized that the judge who takes on extra-judicial functions risks having his or her
impartiality questioned should an issue related to the subject matter of their non-judicial activity
arise before them in Court.146 In certain cases, it is difficult to see how a particular judge who
had written a report and made certain factual findings and advocated a particular policy position
could be reasonably perceived by the public as an impartial adjudicator on a related matter. In
the circumstances of the Chief Justice’s involvement in the awarding of the Order of Canada to
Dr. Morgentaler, concerns were raised regarding the Chief Justice’s impartiality on future related
issues before the Supreme Court of Canada.147 If a judge continues to advocate for
recommendations made extra-judicially, this may further call into question the judge’s
impartiality at least in respect to this issue should it arise judicially.
Institutionally, attacks on an individual judge’s impartiality may taint the entire court,
particularly if it is a court of appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. In the limited experience
in this area, allegations of bias against an individual Supreme Court justice have attempted to
taint the entire Court.148 Extra-judicial activities by judges increase the risk of allegations of bias
144
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against them and against the Court upon which they sit. Thus, it is likely that should a case
involving Dr. Morgentaler or one of his clinics come before the Court, one of the parties will
bring a motion to disqualify the Chief Justice based on her involvement in awarding the Order of
Canada to him. This would be an unnecessary questioning of the Chief Justice and the Court’s
impartiality which has the potential to undermine the Court’s legitimacy as an impartial arbiter of
disputes.

V. CONCLUSION: WHEN TO SAY YES AND LEARNING TO SAY NO –
THE FUTURE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS PUBLIC POLICY TOOL
In this paper, I have described the growing trend in Canada towards the judicialization of
politics through the Executive’s use of judges to assume various public policy roles. In many
cases, the motives of the Executive cannot be impugned and involve the desire to address a
particular public policy problem. However, in some cases what the executive is seeking is not
the expertise of a particular judge (although in some cases they certainly are) but rather a generic
judge accompanied by the substantial political capital of judicial independence. As I outlined in
Part II of this paper, the concept of judicial independence is directly tied to the adjudication of
disputes. Judicial independence is a second-order norm, valued not in and of itself, but rather as
a means of promoting and ensuring first-order norms such as impartiality and the rule of law.
When judges engage in extra-judicial activities, by definition they are acting outside of their core
judicial role in adjudicating disputes. As I have attempted to demonstrate in this paper, this
creates something of a paradox. The rationale for judicial independence disappears when judges
are acting outside of their judicial role but it is precisely this independence that the executive
branch of government is tapping into and drawing upon as a political capital to assist the
executive in dealing with various public policy issues.
While there is no question that the use of judges in various extra-judicial capacities has
significant public policy benefits, it may also have negative implications.149 In this paper, I have
focused on one such negative effect: the potential damage to judicial independence over the long
term through the over-reliance on its appropriation by the executive with the acquiescence of the
case. See generally Adam M. Dodek, “Constitutional Legitimacy and Responsibility: Allegations of Bias after
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada” (2004), 24 SCLR (2d) 165. The normal procedure is to bring a motion to
recuse a particular judge, before that judge. See e.g. Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] S.C.J. No.
75, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851 (Bastarache J.).
149
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judiciary. As my colleagues Ed Ratushny and Daphne Gilbert have recently argued, “[t]he
independence and impartiality of the Canadian judiciary is a national treasure. No risk should be
taken of placing it in jeopardy, no matter how remote that risk might be.”150 For these reasons,
we need to ensure that judicial independence is not compromised by extra-judicial activities.
Below I outline how I think this issue should be addressed in Canada.
The default rule that judges are always available to take up executive tasks should be
changed. In light of tradition and practice in Canada, I do not think it wise that we go the route
of Australia or the United States and essentially prohibit most extra-judicial executive activities
by judges. However, I do think that the judiciary needs to become more selective and more
assertive in deciding which functions that they should take on. This needs to be done both on a
categorical level with respect to what sorts of extra-judicial activities are proper or prudent as
well as on a case by case basis when issues arise. There needs to be both a process and
principles to evaluate extra-judicial activities.
First, as far as process there needs to be both judicial reflection on these issues as well as
discussion with the executive. On the former, Chief Justices, judges associations and the
Canadian Judicial Council should begin to think about ways to address the issue of the
appropriateness of taking on extra-judicial roles. As the body statutorily-charged with
overseeing the conduct of federally-appointed judges, the Canadian Judicial Council is uniquely
placed to take a leadership role on this issue. It has already taken strides in this respect with its
1998 statement on the appointment of federally-appointed judges to commissions of inquiry and
its cautions in the Ethical Principles for Judges. It should build on this work by striking a
committee or working group to determine guidelines for what sorts of activities federallyappointed judges should and should not carry out that would revisit, expand and operationalize
its 1998 work. The Canadian Judicial Council should also establish a committee that would vet
all requests for a federally-appointed judge to head a public inquiry, assume a proposed new
legislated role, or take on an ad-hoc executive assignment. A general request would be made
first to this committee and then to the Chief Justice of the court in which the proposed judge sits.
The Chief Justice of that court ultimately retains veto power but any decision would be made in
consultation with the committee of the Canadian Judicial Council. To be clear, I think that Chief
Justices have not been exercising their veto power as often as they should and that an established
committee of the Canadian Judicial Council which does not work with a provincial or federal
government on a daily basis – as Chief Justices and their offices do – may be better positioned
to provide advice on the pitfalls of some proposed extra-judicial activity. It would also be easier
for a Chief Justice to say no when the Canadian Judicial Council is part of the equation.
Once the judiciary as an institution have begun to consider the ramifications of extrajudicial activities, they should engage the executive at both the federal and provincial levels in
order to establish both substantive guidelines as to what sort of executive activities are
150
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appropriate for judges to take on as well as procedural guidelines for determining the
appropriateness of a particular request by the Executive.
As far as the substantive principles that should be considered in both processes, again, the
Canadian Judicial Council’s 1998 work provides an excellent foundation. The key factors set
out in the 1998 statement remain the touchstones for consideration. First and foremost, judges
should not involve themselves in disputes that are essentially of a partisan nature. Second, they
should not be used to conduct investigations which essentially involve criminal or civil liability.
Third, the executive must give judges sufficient institutional support in terms of resources, time
and independence in order to be able to successfully complete their mandate. Fourth, is the
proposed extra-judicial activity essentially an attempt to relitigate an issue that the executive
chose not to pursue in the courts. Fifth, in each case, the judiciary as an institution must inquire
as to why a judge or a specific judge is required for the desired action, as opposed to a lawyer or
another person. In every instance, consideration of each particular public inquiry or extrajudicial executive assignment requires a consideration of principle and pragmatism.
Despite their contribution to public policy development, individual judges and
particularly chief justices should begin to exercise more discretion in accepting such
appointments.151 They should not acquiescence to judicial participation in every political inquiry
or other activity that the political executive wishes to launch. Having set out standards for the
exercise of discretion, the Canadian Judicial Council needs to take a more active role and chief
justices should begin to exercise that discretion. Sometimes, in the name of protecting judicial
independence, the judiciary needs to say no to the executive.
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